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FuTURE INTERESTS-EFFECT OF LIMITED PoWER OF REvocATION IN DETER·
MINING VALIDITY oF INTER V1vos TRUST UNDER RuLE AGAINST PERPETurrms-

Settlor created an inter vivos trust, reserving to himself the income for life plus an
absolute, non-cumulative right to withdraw sums not in excess of $1500 per year.
The trust was otherwise irrevocable. Measurea from the date of the inter vivos
transaction, some of the limitations clearly violated the rule against perpetuities;
· measured from the date of settlor's death, all limitations would be valid. The trust
fund, some twenty years after its creation, amounted to about $32,000. Held,
the crucial date was that of creation. Ryan v. Ward, (Md. 1949) 64 A.(2d) 258.
Although it is a rule against remoteness of vesting,1 the rule against perpet·
uities is one of the major results of judicial ingenuity in preventing the restriction

1 GRAY, THE RuLE AGAINST PERPETUITIES, 4th ed., §2 (1942); 2 SIMES, FOTUIIE'
INTERBsTs, §490 (1936); Leach, "Perpetuities in a Nutshell," 51 HARv. L. REv. 638 (1938);
Fraser, "The Rationale of the Rule Against Perpetuities," 6 MINN. L. REv. 560 (1922).
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of practical alienability for an unreasonable length of time. 2 The period of the
rule is counted from the time the instrument in question takes effect. If a will,
it dates from the testator's death; if a deed, it dates from its delivery. 3 However,
cases and theory indicate that when one person4 has a present right to freely dispose of the entire fund for his own benefit5 the rule does not apply to the future
interests subject to being eliminated by the exercise of this right so long as the right
exists. 6 The reason is that marketability is not impaired to any serious degree so
long as there is a person who has a general power of appointment or revocation.
For example, X creates an inter vivos trust, reserving a life estate to himself, life
estate to those of his children living at his death, remainder on the death of his
last child to the then living descendents of Y. If the trust is irrevocable, the gift
to the living descendants of Y is clearly bad. 7 However, if X reserves an unlimited
power to revoke, all provisions are good. 8 The trouble comes when the power to
revoke is either limited as in the principal case or rests on a condition. Suppose X
reserved a power to revoke after giving six months notice. In such a case, the period
of the rule would probably begin to run not later than six months before the
settlor's death. Even if X gave notice immediately after creating the trust, he
might die within five months, and a child conceived after notice was given might
be the last to die; consequently, the limitation to Y's descendants violates the rule. 9
2 GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUl'I'IES, 4th ed., §§2.l, 268 (1942); 2 SIMES, FuTURE lNrERESTS §§490, 515 (1936).
3 2 SIMEs, FUTURE lNrERESTs §494 (1936), and cases cited.
4 Future intexests are subject to the rule even though a numbex of people together could
alienate the entire property, since alienability is still materially clogged. In re Hargreaves, 43
Ch. D. 401 (1889); 2 SIMES, FuTURE lNrEREsTs §514 (1936). However, cotenancies seem
to be an exception to this rule. Id. §515.
ti Cases where the trustee has full power to change the investment are not within the
scope of the exception, since the beneficial interests remain inalienable. Wheelex v. Fellowes,
52 Conn. 238 (1884).
6 GRAY, THE RuLE AGAINST PERPETUITIES, 4th ed., §203 (1942); 2 SIMEs, FUTURE
lNrEREsTs §515 (1936); 4 PROPERTY REsTATEMENT §373 (1944); Pulitzex v. Livingston,
89 Me. 359, 36 A. 635 (1896); MilHin's Appeal, 121 Pa. 205, 15 A. 525 (1888); Equitable
Trust Co. v. Pratt, 117 Misc. 708, 193 N.Y.S. 152 (1922). But cf. Anderson, "The Modexn
Rule Against Pexpetuities," 77 UNIV. PA. L. REv. 862 (1929). Examples of such future
intexests are: (1) Limitations following a barrable fee tail. Leach, ''Perpetuities in a Nutshell," 51 HARv. L. REv. 638 (1938); Fraser, "The Rationale of the Rµle Against Pexpetuities," 6 MxNN. L. REv. 560 (1922); but cf. GRAY, THE RuLB AGAINST PERPETUITJES, 4th
ed., §446 (1942). (2) Intexests subject to a general power of appointment. 2 SIMES, FUTURE
lNrEREsTs §516 (1936). (3) One case held that the rule does not apply to insurance trusts
during the time the settlor retains powex to change beneficiaries. Manufacturers Life Ins. Co.
v. von Hamm Young Co., 34 Hawaii 288 (1937); 51 HARV. L. REv. 172 (1937); but cf.
Morris, "The Rule Against Perpetuities as Applied to Living Trusts," 11 UNIV. Crn. L.
REv. 327 (1937).
7 X is conclusively presumed capable of having children. Jee v. Audley, I Cox. 324, 29
Eng. Rep. 1186 (1787); 23 CoL. L. REv. 50 (1923); 32 MICH. L. REv. 414, 702 (1934);
47 HARv. L. REv. 1061 (1934). If X was of advanced age when he executed the deed, the
court might hold that he intended as grantees ouly those children then living. In re Wright's
Estate, 284 Pa. 334, 131 A. 188 (1925). If so, the trust would not violate the rule.
8 Note 6, supra.
9 The period in gross must be taken at the end of the lives in being and not at the
beginning. Fidelity & Columbia Trust Co. v. Tiffany, 202 Ky. 618, 260 S.W. 357 (1924).
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In like manner, where the settlor's power _to revoke is limited, not by a requirement
of notice, but as to amount, the period of the rule may well start to run before the
settlor's death. In the principal case, where the settlor retained at all times the
right to revoke the trust to the extent of $1500, the court could have held the trust·
provisions valid as to that amount.10 The court does not discuss this possibility,
however, and probably settlor would not have intended to have the fund so divided. With a larger amount or proportion involved, a different result as to the
sum subject to the power of revocation might well be reached.11
Andrew W. Lockton, III, S. Ed.

10 Note 6, supra.
112 Sn,ms, FOTURB hm:!REsTs §§520 et seq., especially §529 (1936).

